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The Need for Gallie Theory 
Three neighboring cities have inadequate water supply systems. 
Their forecasts of water demand in each of the areas ten years 
ahead tell them that something has to  be done. It is clear to  deci- 
sion makers in each city that they must either build a joint system 
or pay a lot more for separate systems. 
Their common objective is to  provide sufficient water at the 
lowest cost, dividing the cost fairly among the three communities. 
The  easiest way is to  allocate costs in proportion t o  population, 
and let it go at that. But as anyone who has ever been involved in 
such an allocation knows, the easiest way may be far from fair. 
In fact, there may be no  completely equitable solution t o  
such problems. which turn up in great numbers of cases involving 
publicly regulated enterprises. What decision makers need is not 
the correct answer to  cost allocation, which does not exist, but 
rather, a reasonable - nearly .fair - answer. 
To  get the best solution t o  cost allocation problems, decision 
makers must deal. at  least to some extent,  with advanced mathe- 
matical methods such as game theory. While few officials respon- 
sible for resource development will have degrees in mathematics, 
they nevertheless need a t  least a rudimentary understanding of 
what these methods are, why they are used, and how they work 
in real applications. This Executive Report has been prepared to  
provide such understanding. 
It is based largely on a Research Report published by the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in 
Laxenburg, Austria. In RR-80-32: Cost Allocation in Water 
Resources Development - A Case Study of Sweden, IIASA scien- 
tists H. Peyton Young, N. Okada, and T. Hashimoto compare tradi- 
tional methods of allocating costs with more recently developed 
methods involving cooperative game theory. Their purpose is to  
show how these methods work in practice. 
In preparing their report, the authors, who are from the US 
and Japan, drew upon information and suggestions provided by 
scientists from several other countries, including IIASA scientists 
J .  Kindler of Poland and L. de Mare of Sweden, and collaborating 
scientists 0 .  Menshikova and I. Menshikov of the USSR. Such far- 
ranging international collaboration on problems of mutual concern 
is typical of the research done at IIASA. 
An actual water resource development project in the Skine 
region of southern Sweden was chosen for study. Itscost allocation 
problems are common ones, and they have been well documented 
over the last decade. 
After applying several currently popular game theory methods 
of cost allocation to  the water project in Sweden, the three authors 
of the IIASA Research Report felt that these methods d o  indeed 
have many significant advantages over naive methods. However, 
they also noted that. in actual applications, it may be unrealistic 
to  expect the kind of information and technical understanding 
that game theory requires. 
They concluded that, as a practical matter, there are cases 
when using a single numerical criterion for costing, such as appor- 
tioning costs by population or  by demand, may be preferable to  
more complicated methods. 
WHY THE PROBLEM IS COMPLEX 
The three hypothetical cities mentioned at the outset illustrate the 
complexity of the problem. City A can build its own separate 
water facility for $6.5 million. City B, which is smaller, can build 
for $4.2 million, and City C, smaller yet,  can build for $1.5 mil- 
lion. The  total cost of building three separate water facilities is 
$1 2.2 million. 
The  economies of scale are readily apparent from the table 
at the beginning of this report. A joint waterworks serving all 
three cities would cost $10.6 million, o r  $1.6 million less than the 
cost of building three separate facilities. A three-city facility is 
also cheaper than any combination of a two-city facility and a 
separate facility. 
The decision makers concerned with water resource develop- 
ment in the three cities are in complete agreement. A three-city 
facility is best. But a fair allocation of the cost turns out  to  be a 
serious problem. 
- - 
WATER COSTS OF THREE CITIES 
The population, water use (cubic meters per year), and cost o f  bui lding sepa- 
rate water facilities are shown fo r  three adjacent cities. I n  a typical program, 
the annual water use wou ld  be a forecast o f  needs several years ahead, when 
new separate o r  jo in t  facilities would be completed. 
One way is to  allocate in proportion t o  population. City A 
has 100 000 inhabitants. B has 40,000, and C has 10,000. To  build 
a $10.6 million joint waterworks using this method, City A would 
pay $7.1 million, City B $2.8 million, and City C $700,000. 
The solution is simple - but not  fair. City A would pay $7.1 
million to  join with the others. and yet it could build its own 
separate facility (and have complete control over it) for only $6.5 
million. At the same time both B and C would be getting a big 
break, with City C paying less than half of what a separate facility 
would cost i t .  
Allocating costs on the basis of use gives even worse results. 
When the project is completed, City A will be using 14 million 
cubic meters of water a year (at a greater rate per capita than the 
other two cities because of its greater commercial and industrial 
development). City B will use 4.8 million cubic meters a year, 
and City C will use 1.2 million cubic meters a year. 
Allocating the $10.6 million according t o  anticipated water 
demand would make City A's water bill $7.4 million, City B's 
$2.6 million, and City C's $600,000. This way, City A pays an 
even greater penalty for  joining the group, while B and C can pay 
even less. 
TWO ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES 
All proportional allocations are as unsatisfactory as the two de- 
scribed above because they ignore lower-cost alternatives available 
t o  entities and t o  coalitions of entities smaller than the whole coali- 
tion. T o  be fair, allocation in the example must provide individual 
rationality (no city paying more than it would alone) and group 
rationality (no  possible subgrouping of cities paying more than it 
would as a group). This is the principle of rationality. 
Individual rationality makes it unfair to  charge City A more 
than $6.5 million for its share in the joint waterworks because 
that is how much it would cost A to  build a separate water facility. 
Group rationality makes it unfair t o  charge City A plus City B 
more than $10.3 million, the cost t o  these two cities of building 
jointly and leaving out  City C. 
Note that fairness as applied by the principle of rationality is 
more than an ideal. Any of the three cities would be tempted t o  
back out  of a three-city project costing that city more than it 
would have to  pay alone or in a two-city project. 
A second principle of allocation is that no  entity in a joint 
project should pay less than the marginal cost of including it .  
Cities A, B, and C can be served for $10.6 million, but  A and B 
can be served, excluding C, by a two-city facility for $10.3 million. 
Therefore, C should pay at least $300,000, the marginal (or separ- 
able) cost of serving it. Similarly, A should pay not  less than its 
marginal cost of $5.3 million, B not  less than $2.6 million. 
Like rationality, marginal cost extends t o  all possible com- 
binations. Every group of entities should be charged a t  least the 
additional cost of serving i t ;  no group should subsidize any other 
group. For  example, the marginal cost of including the group AB 
in the group ABC is $9.1 million ($10.6 million minus $1.5 mil- 
lion). 
Rationality requires that no  entity (such as a city) o r  
group of entities be charged more in the total coalition than it 
would pay on its own. 
Marginal cost requires that  no  entity o r  group of entities 
be charged less than the cost of including it in the total coalition. 
In the mathematical formulations of game theory, both of 
these requirements define the same set of inequalities. When all 
costs have been allocated, the two objectives are equivalent. 
FIVE ALLOCATION METHODS 
Five recently developed techniques of cost allocation were evalu- 
ated by the  IIASA scientists in relation t o  an actual water develop- 
ment project in Sweden. They are described below in brief, general 
terms. All of them derive from cooperative game theory, which is 
based on mathematical formulas that are too technical t o  serve the 
purposes of this Executive Report. 
In game theory, difficult problems are seen as games t o  be 
played. T o  avoid confusion, individuals, groups, and sometimes 
even coalitions of groups are referred t o  as "players" when they 
act together. 
The  term "game theory" refers t o  the determination of how 
a game should o r  would be played under certain circumstances. 
(The tern1 "gaming" refers t o  the design of games and experi- 
mentation t o  see how subjects actually play such games.) In "co- 
operative" game theory, the players are assumed t o  be able t o  form 
coalitions for their mutual benefit. In other situations, each player 
may act competitively in his own interest, as an example in Chapter 
3 will illustrate. 
In game theory, the principles of rationality and marginal 
cost can be expressed in a set of inequalities. The core of the 
game defines a restricted set of solutions t o  the set of inequalities. 
The inequalities incorporate all the limits imposed by both prin- 
ciples, so that unfairness can be identified, manipulated, and 
reduced. 
The core can be seen as a set of guidelines for cost allocation 
that narrows the choice of acceptable possibilities. As in the three- 
city waterworks example, the core ilsually identifies a range of 
costs, not  a unique answer. In many cases there may be no  answer 
at all, because no  cost allocations can be made t o  satisfy rationality 
o r  marginal cost. This may happen in projects where the rate of 
cost savings begins t o  decrease as the size of the project increases 
beyond some point. 
When there is no unique set of costs, one for  each player, but 
only a range of such costs, o r  when there is no  set of costs at all, 
adjustments must be made. One of the most common approaches 
in game theory is to  look for a natural way to  modify the inequali- 
ties that define the core. Such modifications can narrow the range 
of costs o r  produce one where none existed. 
The  first three of the cost allocation methods outlined below 
modify the core. 
The nucleolus. When the core is "empty," so that no cost 
allocations meet the tests of rationality and marginal cost, it is 
because the best cost alternatives for some of the players are too 
good compared with the best alternatives for the whole group of 
players. In this case, one approach is t o  tax all combinations of 
separate and joint projects except a joint project involving the 
whole group. The idea is t o  impose the smallest uniform tax that 
will make a whole-group project advantageous t o  all players. 
When the core is not empty,  it is usually t oo  full. This means 
that it gives a range of answers. In this case, the choice can be 
narrowed by the opposite technique - subsidizing all combinations 
other than the whole group by a uniform amount. If this still re- 
sults in several answers, the choice can be narrowed further t o  a 
single answer, called the nucleolus~ by an extension of the same 
reasoning. 
The weak nucleolus. This method imposes a minimum uniform 
tax on  any individual if he takes any course of action other than 
joining the whole group of players. This makes the whole-group 
project advantageous to  all, but under a different set of advantages 
and drawbacks from those of the nucleolus method. Individual 
users can also be subsidized to  narrow alternatives further, and this 
too produces results that differ from uniformly subsidizing coali- 
tions. 
The proportional n~tcleolus. This variation on  the theme mod- 
ifies the core by putting a minimum tax or  subsidy on  players 
in proportion to  how much they save. For  example, neither City A 
nor City C can d o  any better by building a two-city water facility 
(AC) than it can by going it alone (because they lack a common 
border). But both of them can save money in a two-city or  three- 
city coalition involving City B. Subsidizing B will narrow the 
range of admissible costs for the whole group, ABC. 
The Shapley value. This allocation method was suggested by 
L.S. Shapley in 1953, and it still offers a reasonable and relatively 
simple answer to  some costing problems. Rather than ~nodifying 
the core, this  neth hod assumes that each player has joined the com- 
mon group in some identifiable order. I t  also assumes that all pos- 
sible orders for signing up are equally likely. 
If a group of players has already signed up. the additional 
cost of including the next player t o  arrive determines his marginal 
cost contribution. When the marginal cost contributions of each 
player are determined for every possible sequence of joining and 
averaged, the result is the Shapley value. 
SHAPLEY VALUES 
(millions of dollars) 
The Shapley value is each city's average marginal contribution to a three-city 
coalition. First, the cost of adding each city to the coalition is determined for 
all six possible orders of joining. Then the costs for each city are totaled and 
averaged. The marginal contribution figures can be derived from the informa- 
tion on the inside front cover of this report. 
Order of 
joining 
Marginal contribution 
A B 
ABC 
ACB 
B AC 
BC A 
CAB 
CBA 
Total 36.2 21.2 6.2 
Shapley value 6.033 3.533 1.033 
For  example, if City A were the first t o  contemplate building 
a waterworks, its marginal cost contribution woulcl come to  $6.5 
million. If City B then joined in, [he resulting two-city facility 
would cost $10.3 million. City B's marginal cost contribution 
would then be $3.8 million ($10.3 million minus $6.5 million). 
Adding City C would provide a three-city facility costing $10.6 
million, so in this case C's marginal cost contribution would be a 
 nodes st $300,000 ($10.6 million minus $10.3 million). The methocl 
may still be useful even though two-city ancl three-city facilities 
cannot actually be built as marginal increments t o  smaller facilities. 
As can be seen frorn the example, the last of the three cities 
to  join the group fares best. But all orders of joining are considered 
in calculating the Shapley value. The marginal cost contributions 
of each of the three cities for the six possible orders (ABC, ACB, 
BAC, BCA, CAB, and CBA) are averaged. This allocation method 
assigns the following costs for a $10.6 rnillion three-city facility: 
City A,  $6,033,000; City B, $3,533,000; City C, 5 1,033,000. 
The separable costs-remaining benefits (SCRB) method. This 
method is commonly used to  allocate the costs of water develop- 
ment projects. It is based on the simple and therefore highly appeal- 
ing idea that joint costs should be allocated, more or  less, in pro- 
portion to  the willingness of the user t o  pay, which in turn is a 
reflection of the benefit to  the user of the proposed facilities. 
First, each player is assigned the marginal or separable cost 
of including him in the project. (The computation was illustrated 
in the discussion of the marginal cost principle on page 4.) This 
means that City A will be charged $5.3 million, B $2.6 million, 
and C $0.3 million. However, the sum of these separable costs, 
$8.2 million, is not enough to  cover the cost of the joint $10.6 
million project; it is still necessary to  find another $2.4 million. 
This is known as the nonseparable cost of the scheme. 
The justifiable cost for a player is either the cost of going 
alone or  the amount that he is willing t o  pay, whichever is lower. 
In this example. we assume that for each player the cost of going 
alone is smaller, that is, each player could be justified in building 
alone if necessary. 
The remaining benefit is the justifiable cost less the marginal 
cost. The SCRB method proposes that the nonseparable cost be 
divided among the participants in proportion to  their remaining 
benefits. For  example, City A would have to  pay $6.5 million for 
a separate facility; at the moment it is only being charged its 
marginal cost, $5.3 million. Thus, if only the separable costs are 
charged, A would benefit by $1.2 million, B would have a remain- 
ing benefit of $1.6 million, and C a remaining benefit of $1.2 mil- 
lion. The  total remaining benefit is therefore $4  million. This 
means that A, which takes 1.214 of the total remaining benefit, 
should pay 1.214 of the nonseparable cost, o r  $0.72 million. This 
is added t o  its separable cost contribution of $5.3 million t o  give 
a total of $6.02 million. Similarly, B would pay $3.56 million 
(2.6 + 0.96) and C $1.02 million (0.3 + 0.72). 
Variations of the SCRB method first allocate the separable 
costs and then assign the nonseparable cost in proportion to  pop- 
ulation, use, o r  some other criterion. The shortcoming of the 
SCRB method is that the simple process of allocating costs in pro- 
portion to  benefits can sometimes become unrealistic because of 
the need to  start by allocating the separable costs. This can lead to  
some strange results, as will be shown in the next chapter. 
Few cost allocations, in fact, are as s in~ple and free of com- 
plicating considerations as the one undertaken by hypothetical 
cities A, B, and C. The next chapter suggests how the metllods 
outline? here might apply to an actual problem of cost allocation. 

The basic cost allocation principles and methods described in the 
preceding chapter were applied to  a water development project 
involving 18 municipalities in the Sk8ne region of southern Sweden. 
The  study dealt with data for the period 1970-80 that were 
readily avaiiable in detail from the administrators of the project. 
The year 1970 was chosen as a vantage point. A water supply 
THE SKANE REGION OF SWEDEN 
(18 municipalities) 
system was designed and its costs allocated by various methods t o  
fill the needs perceived and forecast from 1970 t o  1980. This made 
it possible t o  see how the municipalities would have fared under 
each of the allocation methods in a real-world setting. The approach 
also served t o  show how the methods work and t o  demonstrate 
their shortcomings when applied t o  a complex and changing cost 
allocation problem. 
ESTABLISHING GROUPS 
Most o f  the water now supplied t o  the region comes from three 
sources - local groundwater and two separate pipeline systems 
from different lakes. By the late 1940s, some of the municipalities 
were aware that local water resources might no t  be sufficient for 
f i~ tu r e  needs, so they began looking for  off-site sources. In the 
1960s several of them formed the Sydvatten (South Water) 
Company,  an  association for planning the long-term water supply 
of the region. 
Working out a waterworks. Sydvatten Company executives charged with plan- 
ning the long-term water supply of the S k h e  region include (left to right) 
Economist Carl Erik Davidson, Managing Director Lars Reingardt, Project 
Manager Nils M8rtenson. and Planning Engineer lngvar Bornrnyr. 
By the late 1960s. Sydvatten had begun to  design a major 
project for obtaining water from Lake Bolmen, a source outside 
the region that would require a tunnel 8 0  kilometers long. The 
project has been undertaken, but it is not  expected t o  have any 
impact on the area's water supply until the late 1980s. 
More costs to  come. By the late 1980s, a tunnel 80 kilometers long w ~ l l  
bring water from Lake Bolmen to  the Sk8ne region. The photograph (by 
courtesy of Scandia Photopress) shows workers excavating a section of the 
tunnel. 
From the outset.  it was clear to  the Swedish planners that the 
success of the Lake Bolmen project would depend on the number 
of municipalities joining in. That,  in turn, would depend on the 
cost to  each comnlunity compared with the cost of developing 
its own on-site water resources. 
Cost allocation for the project was originally based on popu- 
lation, and it remains so today. But unforeseen changes have oc- 
curred since 1970, such as greatly escalated costs, improved esti- 
mates of local resources that are more optimistic, and rates of 
growth in demand that are lower than expected. As a result, the 
population-based cost allocation has been brought into question. 
The decision makers involved have been open to  the possibility 
of trying a different approach. 
T o  deal with cost allocation in tangible terms, the IIASA 
team confined its study to  local supply possibilities during a 10- 
year period - excluding new off-site sources such as Lake Bolmen. 
The  supply options include expanding the two pipeline systems 
and making greater use of local groundwater sources. 
The  first problem they encountered in establishing a more 
equitable cost allocation method was to  identify the groups of 
users (players) in the total water demand system. It woultl be 
impractical to  develop costs for each of the 262,143 possible 
groupings of the 18 municipalities. 
The municipalities were found t o  form natural groups based 
on past associations, geographical locations, existing water trans- 
mission systems, and hydrological and geographical features deter- 
mining the natural routes for water transmission networks. 
After careful study, the municipalities were grouped into six 
independent units. Group H, for example, consists of three munic- 
ipalities already connected by the Ringsjon water supply system in 
1970, together with Svalov, which would be in the middle of the 
transmission route serving the other three municipalities in a joint 
project. 
The six groups were then treated as players in an analysis of 
alternative cost allocations. After an allocation based on the six 
groups has been determined, an allocation among the municipalities 
within each group can be made using a similar method. However, 
this would not necessarily give the same results as would treating 
all 18 municipalities separately. 
- - -  
SIX GROUPS OF MUNICIPALITIES 
Group Municipalities in the group 
A Angelholm, &torp, Bjuv, Hoganas, 
Klippan 
H Helsingborg, Eslov, Landskrona, 
Svalov 
K Kavlinge, Lomma 
L Lu nd 
M Malmo, Burlov, Staffanstorp 
T Trelleborg, Svedala, Vellinge 
To test cost allocation methods in an actual water development project, the 
18 municipalities of the Skine region were combined in six groups. Full lines 
indicate the existing water supply network; broken lines show where the net- 
work will be extended when a 10-year water development project i s  finished. 
Shaded areas indicate water; the two lakes serving as major water sources for 
the region are to the east of the region. 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS 
Combining municipalities in to  groups poses a cost allocation prob- 
lem that does not  appear in the simplified example used in Chapter 
1. Such groupings have direct costs, incurred by each municipality 
in the group regardless of the water supply system chosen by the 
group. Costs that depend on whether the group builds a separate 
facility or  joins various coalitions are indirect costs to  each munic- 
ipality in the group. The problem is that the distinction between 
direct and indirect costs can be difficult to  make. 
For  example, water delivery costs within each municipality 
are direct costs, and theoretically they should be allocated to  each 
municipality independently of the  six-group allocation. But in 
practice such costs are hard t o  distinguish. 
Water delivered by the joint supply network must be pumped 
t o  a reservoir for distribution within the municipality. The higher 
the pressure when the water reaches the municipality, the less the 
cost of the pumping equipment. Therefore, the costs of distribution 
within the six groups, which have from one t o  five municipalities 
in them, depend on the source chosen within the water supply 
system. 
The water supply system includes two lakes (Ringsjon and 
Vombsjon), one major groundwater aquifer (Alnarp), and minor 
on-site sources. The possible routes of a water transmission net- 
work (based on a preliminary analysis) are shown on the map on 
page 15. 
The definition of costs is always somewhat arbitrary, regard- 
less of the allocation method, so a method that ignores direct 
costs is best. A weakness of the SCRB method is that,  in basing 
the calculation on willingness to  pay, i t  must establish direct costs 
that are hard t o  define, such as local pumping costs. 
T o  make costs consistent for each method tested, so that 
SCRB could be compared with the other  methods, water pressure 
was assumed to  be the same at each demand point regardless of 
source. In this way, the cost of distributing water within each 
community does not  depend on source, so it is a direct cost, ex- 
cluded from the calculation of costs for each of the six groups. 
Water delivered t o  each municipality was assumed t o  be of 
uniform cluality. T o  attain this quality, water is treated at the 
source. so costs of treatment were considered indirect costs and 
included in the calculation of group costs. 
The calculation of total cost for each group was based on 
mathematical formulas. This provided estimates of the least-cost 
combination of alternative supply sources for each group separately 
and for all possible coalitions, including a coalition of all six 
groups. 
Comparing the total cost estimates shows the relative strength 
of each group, which depends on the  cost and availability of local 
resources and access to  the resources of others. For  example, 
Group L finds the cost of going it alone high, despite being close 
t o  the major regional sources, Ringsjon and Vombsjon, neither of 
which it owns. So L has a strong incentive t o  join with H and M.  
Groups H and M have the lowest unit costs because they own 
the two major supply systems. And they can make their unit costs 
still lower by joining with other groups, thanks to  the economies 
THE COSTS OF COALITIONS 
(millions of kronor) 
The figures were determined by mathematical formulas that expressed costs 
in terms of availability of local water resources and least-cost alternative ac- 
cess to the resources of others in the region. Commas signify that the least- 
cost option of a coalition i s  to break up into the subcoalitions indicated. 
Group Total cost Group Total cost Group Total cost 
AHK 
AH L 
AH,M 
AH,T 
4 K . L  
A,KM 
A.K,T 
A, LM 
A, L.T 
A,MT 
HKL 
HKM 
H K,T 
H L,M 
H L,T 
H,MT 
K, LM 
K. L,T 
K,MT 
LMT 
AHKL 
AHKM 
AHK,T 
AH L,M 
AH L,T 
AH,MT 
A,K,LM 
A,K,L,T 
A,K,MT 
A,LMT 
HKL,M 
HKL,T 
H KMT 
H LMT 
K LMT 
AHKL,T 
AHKLM 
AHKMT 
AHLMT 
AKLMT 
H K LMT 
AHKLMT 
of scale. But H can offer potential partners lower costs than M 
can, because its source, Ringsjon, has greater excess capacity than 
Vombsjon, which belongs to  M .  The higher incremental cost of 
joining with M must be reflected in the final cost allocation. 
COMPARING THE METHODS 
Costs for the six groups and their various combinations were allo- 
catecl by population, use, and the five methods outlined in Chapter 
1. The study assumes that all groups participate in a project at a 
total cost of Skr 83.82 million. The costs for each group accord- 
ing t o  each allocation method are shown on page 18. 
SEVEN ALLOCATIONS AT A GLANCE 
(millions of kronor) 
The figures show how costs would be allocated to the six groups of Swedish 
municipalities by each of the allocation methods outlined in Chapter 1. For 
further comparison, the individual rationality costs of building separate facil- 
ities and the marginal costs are shown below the allocations. 
The bar chart illustrates the extent to which the various methods of allocation 
produce contrasting results. 
Allocation method A H K L M T Total 
Proportional to popu- 
lation 
Proportional to demand 
SC R B 
Shapley value 
Nucleolus 
Weak nucleolus 
Proportional nucleolus 
Individual alternative 
costs 
Marginal costs 
Proportional to population 
Pro~ortional to demand 
Shapley value 
Nucleolus 
* 0.31 
19 Weak nucleolus 
C, *
o Proportional nucleolus 
0 
The most obvious fact revealed by the comparison is that the 
two naive methods of allocation - by proportion of population 
and of use - produce the greatest contrasts in costs. The results 
differ markedly from those of all other methods tested. As was 
true of the hypothetical case in Chapter 1, apportioning costs by 
population o r  use charges some groups more than what they would 
have to  pay in pursuing the venture alone. Allocation by popula- 
tion penalizes H and M, while allocation by use penalizes M.  
The two proportional methods fail the test of individual 
rationality by not taking into account differences of access to  
sources. Charged by population or  use. Groups H and M bear the 
brunt of total costs because they have large populations. The 
methods also fail the test of marginal cost. Groups A and T are 
outlying, and their proportional charges by population or  use 
would be far less than what it would cost to  include them in the 
six-group coalition. 
Seemingly more reasonable than proportional methods, but 
actually almost as ill-behaved, is the SCRB method. It meets the 
test of individual rationality because it is cheaper for each group 
t o  join the six-group project than t o  go it alone. But it fails group 
rationality because membership of some coalitions smaller than 
the whole AHKLMT project would be cheaper for the players 
involved. For  example, using separable costs-remaining benefits, 
the three most centrally located groups, H, K ,  ancl L, can build a 
joint waterworks for Skr 27.26 million. In a six-group project, 
SCRB would cost then1 Skr 29.80 million. 
The defect of the SCRB method is that it considers only the 
marginal costs of including players, not the marginal costs of in- 
cluding coalitions of players. The marginal cost of including both 
M and T is much higher than the sum of their individual marginal 
costs because when one of them is being served the added expense 
of serving the otlier is low. The SCRB method avoids estimating 
all cost elements, but this shortcut can end in an inequitable final 
cost distribution. 
By contrast. the Shapley value requires alternative costs for 
all possible subsets. But this method of allocation fails the tests of 
group rationality and marginal cost. For  instance, it charges coali- 
tion HKL Skr 430,000 more than its alternative of builtling a 
facility as an independent group. 
The remaining three methods - nucleolus, weak nucleolus, 
and proportional nucleolus - are potentially more desirable than 
the SCRB and Shapley methods because they start by limiting 
what each player is charged to individual and group rationality 
( t o  provide maximum incentive) and marginal cost ( to  be fair to  
all other groups and coalitions). As noted in Chapter 1, these 
methods further narrow the limits by means of taxes and subsidies. 
ANOTHER ALLOCATION PRINCIPLE 
T o  make the best choice from all the allocation methods available, 
the principle of monotonicity should be considered. A minimum 
requirement of fair allocation, according to  this principle, is that, 
if total costs increase, no player will be charged less, and if total 
costs decrease, no player will be charged more. 
Typically, project costs are not known precisely until after 
the project has been completed. But the allocation method is 
usually agreed upon before the project is started. Since total costs 
are not then known, the allocation may be made for several total 
cost estimates. Then when all players agree t o  begin a joint pro- 
ject, a single total cost is taken t o  be the best estimate and the 
alternatives are abandoned. This cost is likely t o  be off the mark 
by the time the project is finished. So,  to  evaluate the method of 
cost allocation, different levels of total cost should be allocated 
under the assumption of fixed levels of alternative costs. 
Several of the methods discussed in this report do  not  meet 
the test of monotonicity. For  example, suppose the 18-municipality 
project in southern Sweden ends with a cost overrun of Skr 4 mil- 
lion. That raises the total cost to  Skr 87.82 million, which would 
change costs for all six groups under all the methods, as shown on 
page 2 1 .  
The figures show that by the nucleolus and SCRB methods, 
group K would pay less, even though the total cost of the joint 
project had increased. This suggests that neither of these methods 
is a reasonable way to  allocate costs. 
Methods that do meet the test of monotonicity are those 
allocating costs according to  some single criterion like population 
or  use, the Shapley value, the weak nucleolus, and the proportional 
nucleolus. For  the Shapley value and weak nucleolus, any change 
in total costs is distributed equally among the groups. 
Even here, though, questions of fairness arise. Why should 
all the players have to share added costs equally when their shares 
in the project differ greatly? For  example, in the weak nucleolus 
method, it is possible that a small player contributing almost no 
costs (or  savings) to  the coalition would have t o  pay as much for 
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COSTS RISE 
(millions of kronor) 
The principle of monotonicity states that, as a minimum requirement, a cost 
allocation method should not charge any group less i f  costs unexpectedly rise, 
or more if they fall. The costs allocated to  each group by each method for a 
facility costing Skr 83.82 million are compared below with the allocations 
that would be made for an Skr 87.82 million project (assuming a cost overrun 
of Skr 4 million). The figures in color show that the SCRB and nucleolus 
methods lack monotonicity. 
Allocation method A H K L M T Total 
Proportional to popula- 
tion 
Proportional to demand 
SCRB 
Shapley value 
Nucleolus 
Weak nucleolus 
Proportional nucleolus 
the cost overrun as its giant neighbors. This too constitutes an un- 
reasonable allocation. 
The  fairest way of measuring the shares of each participant 
in the project may not  be by cost. Most of the costs would be in- 
curred in any case by building separate facilities. A reasonable 
method would divide unforeseen costs, such as overruns, in pro- 
portion to  the benefits enjoyed. This is what the proportional 
nucleolus method does. As noted in Chapter 1, it puts a tax on 
players in proportion to  their savings. 
Of all the game theory methods considered, the proportional 
nucleolus appears t o  be the most attractive. But the application 
of the various methods t o  an actual cost allocation problem shows 

that merely comparing the results of using the methods does not 
provide a full evaluation. There remain the questions of acquiring 
the needed information, of getting the players t o  produce the in- 
formation and agree on  it. and of assuring that the players will 
remain committed to  the project after they see how much it will 
cost them. 
What if a player cannot afford to  join the project? What if a 
player has not indicated his true willingness to  pay? Who decides 
whether or  not  outlying municipalities will be included in the 
project? Some of these questions are considered briefly in the last 
chapter of this report. 

The true test is how the method works in practice, and by 
simulating such a test the IIASA scientists have shown that some 
commonly used cost allocation methods are ineffective. 
As noted in Chapters 1 and 2 of this Executive Report,  the 
method should conform to  some basic principles of fairness. 
Rationality prohibits charging any player more in the whole coali- 
tion than he would pay to  build a water supply system alone or  in 
a smaller coalition. Marginal cost is what the whole coalition would 
have to  pay t o  include a new player, and therefore it is the least 
that the player should be charged. 
The method chosen should be adaptable, and in particular it 
should provide monotonicity, so that if the cost of the project rises, 
no player benefits by paying less than before, and if the cost falls, 
no player will pay more. It sllould be insensitive t o  direct  cost.^, so 
that it does not depend on the identification of costs incurred 
entirely within each group, as these costs may be difficult o r  im- 
possible to  isolate. 
In addition to  meeting these needs, the method should be 
simple, so that it can be presented readily to  all the decision makers 
of the municipalities involved. Similarly, it should be based on  
information that can be acquired without undue effort. 
One of  the methods tested, the separable costs-remaining 
benefits method, is currently used for many types of public 
projects where costs must be allocated. In fact, SCRB has a 
number of serious shortcomings. It fails the tests of rationality 
and marginal cost for coalitions smaller than the whole, and of 
monotonicity. The method's underlying objective of allocating 
costs in proportion to benefits is attractive, but difficulties arise 
from the a d  hoe introduction of marginal costs. 
The Shapley value is monotonic, but  it only satisfies ration- 
ality for separate players, no t  for coalitions of players smaller than 
the whole coalition. 
The three methods that modify the core of the game - the 
nucleolus, weak nucleolus, and proportional nucleolus - all satisfy 
rationality and marginal cost. However, the nucleolus is not mono- 
tonic. Both the weak nucleolus and proportional nucleolus are 
monotonic. but  the proportional nucleolus makes a better allo- 
cation of changes in costs, in a way more consistent with the bene- 
fits to  each group. 
None of the five methods passes the tests of simplicity and 
ease of information gathering. They are all fairly complicated, and 
require detailed information on  costs. Information on demand and 
on the optimal scale of development may be unreliable or  non- 
existent. yet these methods rely on  it. This shortcoming is particu- 
larly apparent for a project such as the Swedish water develop- 
ment,  which was based on  estimates of demand and costs 10 years 
ahead. 
The IIASA study concluded that a simple scheme based o n  
allocating costs in proportion t o  population may be the best 
practicable solution for the six-group, 18-municipality case in 
southern Sweden. Insufficient information was available for 
developing a more equitable approach. Accordingly, the decision 
makers in the project chose t o  allocate by population. Its greatest 
inequity falls on  group M, which has the largest and most dense 
population. It could build its own separate water supply facility 
for Skr  20.8 1 million, and yet it would pay Skr 34.22 million for 
the dubious privilege of sharing a facility - and control over it - 
with five other groups that are less urban and so have different 
needs. 
A WAY T O  FIND DEMAND 
The case study by an international group of scientists a t  IIASA 
illustrates how costs are allocated in practice and evaluates some 
common allocation methods. However, another IIASA paper takes 
the problem one step further and suggests an approach that can 
overcome the greatest difficulty encountered in the Swedish study, 
the lack of basic information on willingness t o  pay. 
In Cost Allocation and Demand Revelation in Public Enter- 
prises, an IIASA Working Paper prepared in 1980, H. Peyton 
Young, who was also instrumental in the Swedish study, describes 
a simple method for allocating joint costs in cooperative and pub- 
lic enterprises. The method is based on  bidding, which is nonco- 
operative. This puts the burden of information gathering on the 
players themselves. 
The approach differs from those applied in the Swedish case 
study in that it assumes no knowledge of either demands or  the 
optimal level of production. They are discovered by  a competi- 
tive bidding mechanism. Each group of municipalities in the 
Swedish project would play this game by first determining what 
it would be willing to  pay to  have a water facility under any 
circumstances. In doing so, it would not consult with any of 
the other players. 
The  bidding process begins by each player submitting a sealed 
bid declaring how much he is willing to  pay to  join a proposed fac- 
ility. This amount may be less than what he is truly willing t o  pay, 
reflecting the inclination to  get a good bargain. Any group of mun- 
icipalities (player) can bid, including those in outlying areas. When 
the bids are in, the regulator or  auctioneer chooses the coalition 
of players that maximizes net surplus. In this coalition, the total 
bids exceed the total costs by the highest amount. 
All the players can then bid again, and a new optimum facil- 
ity is determined. Players left ou t  of the project in the first round 
will naturally want to  raise their bids. Those included in the first 
round will try to lower their bids and still remain in the project. 
In this way, the cost allocation process approaches equilibrium. 
For  example, suppose the six players bid t o  be included in a 
joint project as follows: A, 19 (million kronor); H, 12; K ,  8 ;  L, 1 1 ; 
M ,  17; and T,  19. A comparison of the costs of serving each pos- 
sible coalition reveals that the sum of bids less costs is highest for 
the coalition HKL. This excludes groups (or  players) A, M ,  and T .  
In the next round, players A, M ,  and T can be expected t o  
raise their bids slightly, while H, K, and L will keep their bids the 
same or  even decrease them. Round two might produce these bids: 
A, 20 (million kronor); H, 12; K ,  5 ;  L, 9 ; M ,  18: and T,  20. In this 
case, the six group coalition maximizes bids less costs. The s ~ ~ r p l u s  
is only about 18  million kronor, and the result is actually very close 
to  equilibrium. 
The regulator terminates the process after a predetermined 
but  undisclosed number of rounds. Or, the process may end when 
the bids d o  not change appreciably from one round t o  the next.  
Players excluded at this point have no  recourse, and the project is 
undertaken, the players being charged the prices they last bid. 
The outcome may not  reveal the true demands of the players, 
but it comes close enough to  insure that an efficient level of ser- 
vice is provided. If the players bid more than the total cost of 
serving them, a surplus may accumulate. Ideally, this surplus is 
taken as a lump-sum tax on  all players in the whole coalition. It 
could also be put  into an escrow account t o  protect against unfore- 
Urban-rural contrast. Group M, the most densely populated of the six groups, 
has three municipalities, Malmo, Burlov, and Staffanstorp. But i t  also has 
much farmland, which stands in sharp contrast to the urban development, as 
this view of Burlov shows. With costs allocated by population or by use, farm- 
ers pay considerably more for their drinking water than do their competitors 
just to the north in groups K and L. (Photograph by courtesy of Sydvastra 
~ k i n e s  Kommunalforbund) 
seen cost increases, o r  it could be returned t o  the bidders in pro- 
portion to  their bids. 
In theory, redistributing a surplus could distort the bidding 
process if players overbid in anticipation of actually paying less. 
However, such a strategy is unlikely because the players d o  not  
know the other bids. In some cases careful bidding will result in 
a surplus that is negligible. Where the surplus is considered too  large, 
extra rounds of bidding may be arranged. 
A cost allocation based on competitive bidding has several 
advantages. I t  is simple and easy t o  implement, and it leads to  an 
efficient and reasonably fair allocation in the absence of informa- 
tion on demand. 
As a test, the competitive bidding method was applied to  the 
Swedish water project. Decision makers from the six groups dis- 
cussed in Chapter 2 were given information only about their own 
demand. Rounds of bidding were conducted. Only the winning 
set of bids was announced after each round. Although the players 
did not know their costs, as outlined in Chapter 2,  within 10 
rounds the bidding had converged on  a solution within a fraction 
of 1 percent of a solution in the core, and the resulting surplus 
was negligible. 
Competitive bidding is not  presented here as the final word 
on  the problems of allocating costs in public projects. It is most 
effective when there are few players in the game and the advantages 
of a coalition are evident and free of qualifying circumstances. 
The  discussion is presented merely as a way t o  illustrate the 
problems of allocation and the ways of solving them. For a more 
detailed explanation, including the mathematical formulations on 
which much of the material in this report is based, two publications 
available from IIASA are recommended: 
RR-80-32, Cost Allocation in Water Resources Development - A 
Case Study of Sweden, by H.P. Young, N. Okada, and T. Hashimoto. 
WP-80-130, Cost Allocation and Demand Revelation in Public 
Enterprises, by H.P. Young. 
